Philosophical Papers 38 (1):1-12 (2009)

Authors
Anthony Booth
University of Sussex
Abstract
Matthias Steup (Steup 2008) has recently argued that our doxastic attitudes are free by (i) drawing an analogy with compatibilism about freedom of action and (ii) denying that it is a necessary condition for believing at will that S's having an intention to believe that p can cause S to believe that p . In this paper, however, I argue that the strategies espoused in (i) and (ii) are incompatible
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DOI 10.1080/05568640902933379
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References found in this work BETA

Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.
Doxastic Freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.
Explaining Actions with Habits.Bill Pollard - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):57 - 69.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
Believing Intentionally.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2673-2694.
Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.
Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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