Grazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1):265 - 271 (2009)

Authors
Anthony Booth
University of Sussex
Abstract
Rowbottom (2008) has recently challenged my definition of epistemic reasons for action and has offered an alternative account. In this paper, I argue that less than giving an 'alternative' definition, Rowbottom has offered an additional condition to my original account. I argue, further, that such an extra condition is unnecessary, i.e. that the arguments designed to motivate it do not go through.
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DOI 10.1163/9789042026056_013
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