On some recent moves in defence of doxastic compatibilism

Synthese 191 (8):1867-1880 (2014)
Authors
Anthony Booth
University of Sussex
Abstract
According to the doxastic compatibilist, compatibilist criteria with respect to the freedom of action rule-in our having free beliefs. In Booth (Philosophical Papers 38:1–12, 2009), I challenged the doxastic compatibilist to either come up with an account of how doxastic attitudes can be intentional in the face of it very much seeming to many of us that they cannot. Or else, in rejecting that doxastic attitudes need to be voluntary in order to be free, to come up with a principled account of how her criteria of doxastic freedom are criteria of freedom. In two recent papers, Steup (Synthese 188:145–163, 2012; Dialectica 65(4):559–576, 2011) takes up the first disjunct of the challenge by proposing that even though beliefs cannot be practically intentional, they can be epistemically intentional. McHugh (McHugh forthcoming) instead takes up the second disjunct by proposing that the freedom of belief be modelled not on the freedom of action but on the freedom of intention. I argue that both Steup’s and McHugh’s strategies are problematic.
Keywords Ethics of Belief  Doxastic Voluntarism  Compatibilism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0378-x
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References found in this work BETA

Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Doxastic Freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Believing Intentionally.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2673-2694.
Attitudinal Control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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