Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14 (2014)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason for which one believes that p.
|
Keywords | agnosticism state-given reasons |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00631.x |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
View all 14 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
View all 10 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
How to Be a Teleologist About Epistemic Reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2011 - In Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--33.
Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):529-539.
Can There Be Epistemic Reasons for Action?Anthony Robert Booth - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144.
Reasons for Belief, Reasoning, Virtues.Christopher Hookway - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):47--70.
The Essential Tie Between Knowing and Believing: A Causal Account of Knowledge and Epistemic Reasons.L. S. Carrier - 2011 - Edwin Mellen Press.
Foundationalism, Epistemic Dependence, and Defeasibility.Robert Audi - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):119 - 139.
Structural Irrationality.Thomas Scanlon - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan, Robert Goodin, Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Common Minds: Themes From the Philosophy of Philip Pettit. Clarendon Press.
Moral Error Theory and the Argument From Epistemic Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.
Rationalizing Beliefs: Evidential Vs. Pragmatic Reasons.Hamid Vahid - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):447-462.
Putting Particularism in its Place.Joshua Gert - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2012-09-14
Total views
330 ( #24,612 of 2,420,816 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #351,362 of 2,420,816 )
2012-09-14
Total views
330 ( #24,612 of 2,420,816 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #351,362 of 2,420,816 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads