Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons

Abstract
In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason for which one believes that p.
Keywords agnosticism  state-given reasons
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00631.x
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References found in this work BETA
Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
The Domain of Reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.

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Citations of this work BETA
Question‐Directed Attitudes.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.
Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2015 - Noûs 50 (4).

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