Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons


Authors
Anthony Booth
University of Sussex
Abstract
In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason for which one believes that p.
Keywords agnosticism  state-given reasons
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00631.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 45,727
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Domain of Reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
Suspended Judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
Question‐Directed Attitudes.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

How to Be a Teleologist About Epistemic Reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2011 - In Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--33.
Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):529-539.
Can There Be Epistemic Reasons for Action?Anthony Robert Booth - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144.
Reasons for Belief, Reasoning, Virtues.Christopher Hookway - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):47--70.
Structural Irrationality.Thomas Scanlon - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan, Robert Goodin, Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Common Minds: Themes From the Philosophy of Philip Pettit. Clarendon Press.
Reasons and Impossibility.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.
Moral Error Theory and the Argument From Epistemic Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.
Putting Particularism in its Place.Joshua Gert - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-09-14

Total views
322 ( #19,111 of 2,280,959 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #421,058 of 2,280,959 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature