Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14 (2012)
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Abstract

In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason for which one believes that p.

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Anthony Booth
University of Sussex

Citations of this work

Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
Question‐directed attitudes.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.
Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Synthese (3):1-26.
Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3565-3581.

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References found in this work

The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
The domain of reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.

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