The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce

Erkenntnis 75 (1):37-43 (2011)
Abstract
Richard Foley has suggested that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge should be conceived of as two distinct projects. However, he has not offered much support for this claim, beyond highlighting certain salutary consequences it might have. In this paper, I offer some further support for Foley’s claim by offering an argument and a way to conceive the claim in a way that makes it as plausible as its denial, and thus levelling the playing field. The burden of proof then lies with those who seek to deny Foley’s radical suggestion
Keywords Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Ontology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-010-9264-9
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References found in this work BETA
Stick to What You Know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.
Knowledge, Truth, and Duty.Marian David - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Why Responsible Belief is Blameless Belief.Anthony Robert Booth & Rik Peels - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):257-265.
Why Knowledge is Merely True Belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):167-180.

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