Artifact and Artifact Categorization: Comparing Humans and Capuchin Monkeys
Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):375-389 (2013)
Abstract
We aim to show that far-related primates like humans and the capuchin monkeys show interesting correspondences in terms of artifact characterization and categorization. We investigate this issue by using a philosophically-inspired definition of physical artifact which, developed for human artifacts, turns out to be applicable for cross-species comparison. In this approach an artifact is created when an entity is intentionally selected and some capacities attributed to it (often characterizing a purpose). Behavioral studies suggest that this notion of artifact is not specific to the human kind. On the basis of the results of a series of field observations and experiments on wild capuchin monkeys that routinely use stone hammers and anvils, we show that the notions of intentional selection and attributed capacity appear to be at play in capuchins as well. The study also suggests that functional criteria and contextualization play a fundamental role in terms of artifact recognition and categorization in nonhuman primatesDOI
10.1007/s13164-013-0144-5
My notes
Similar books and articles
Artifact Categorization and the Modal Theory of Artifact Function.Bence Nanay - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):515-526.
Artifact and Tool Categorization.Sara Dellantonio, Claudio Mulatti & Remo Job - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):407-418.
Review of Creations of the Mind, ed. Margolis and Laurence. [REVIEW]Brian Epstein - 2012 - Mind 121 (481):200-204.
Computer systems: Moral entities but not moral agents. [REVIEW]Deborah G. Johnson - 2006 - Ethics and Information Technology 8 (4):195-204.
The (Alleged) Inherent Normativity of Technological Explanations.Jeroen De Ridder - 2006 - Techne 10 (1):79-94.
Mind and artifact: A multidimensional matrix for exploring cognition-artifact relations.Richard Heersmink - 2012 - In J. M. Bishop & Y. J. Erden (eds.), Proceedings of the 5th AISB Symposium on Computing and Philosophy (pp. 54-61).
Artifacts and organisms: A case for a new etiological theory of functions.Françoise Longy - 2007 - In Philippe Huneman (ed.), Functions: Selection and Mechanisms. Springer. pp. 185--211.
A cross-species perspective on the selfishness axiom.Sarah F. Brosnan & Frans B. M. de Waal - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):818-818.
Young children are sensitive to how an object was created when deciding what to name it.Paul Bloom - 2000 - Cognition 76 (2):91-103.
Seedless grapes: Nature and culture.Dan Sperber - 2007 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and Their Representaion. Oxford University Press. pp. 124--137.
Optimality vs. intent: Limitations of Dennett's artifact hermeneutics.Krist Vaesen & Melissa van Amerongen - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):779 – 797.
Analytics
Added to PP
2013-05-14
Downloads
49 (#240,943)
6 months
3 (#224,280)
2013-05-14
Downloads
49 (#240,943)
6 months
3 (#224,280)
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Current Perspectives in Philosophy of Biology.Joaquin Suarez Ruiz & Rodrigo A. Lopez Orellana - 2019 - Humanities Journal of Valparaiso 14:7-426.
The question of animal technical capacities.Ana Cuevas Badallo - 2019 - Humanities Journal of Valparaiso 14:139-170.
References found in this work
Primate Cognition.Amanda Seed & Michael Tomasello - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):407-419.