Affective Dimensions of the Phenomenon of Double Bookkeeping in Delusions

Emotion Review 4 (2):187-191 (2012)

Authors
Lisa Bortolotti
University of Birmingham
Abstract
It has been argued that schizophrenic delusions are “behaviourally inert.” This is evidence for the phenomenon of “double bookkeeping,” according to which people are not consistent in their commitment to the content of their delusions. The traditional explanation for the phenomenon is that people do not genuinely believe the content of their delusions. In the article, we resist the traditional explanation and offer an alternative hypothesis: people with delusions often fail to acquire or to maintain the motivation to act on their delusional beliefs. This may be due to avolition, to emotional disturbances, or to the fact that, given the peculiar content of some delusions, the surrounding environment does not support the agent’s motivation to act.
Keywords delusions  double bookkeeping  affect  emotions
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DOI 10.1177/1754073911430115
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References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Rationality, Meaning, and the Analysis of Delusion.J. Campbell - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.
Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: A Case Study.Matthew R. Broome, Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli - 2010 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19 (2):179-187.
Self and World in Schizophrenia: Three Classic Approaches.Louis Arnorsson Sass - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (4):251-270.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Causal Role Argument Against Doxasticism About Delusions.Kengo Miyazono & Lisa Bortolotti - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):30-50.
Can Dispositionalism About Belief Vindicate Doxasticism About Delusion?José Eduardo Porcher - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (3):379-404.

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