A dispositional theory of possibility

Dialectica 62 (1):21–41 (2008)

Authors
Neil E. Williams
State University of New York, Buffalo
Abstract
– The paper defends a naturalistic version of modal actualism according to which what is metaphysically possible is determined by dispositions found in the actual world. We argue that there is just one world—this one—and that all genuine possibilities are anchored by the dispositions exemplified in this world. This is the case regardless of whether or not those dispositions are manifested. As long as the possibility is one that would obtain were the relevant disposition manifested, it is a genuine possibility. Furthermore, by starting from actual dispositional properties and branching out, we are able to include possibilities that are quite far removed from any state of affairs that happens to obtain, while still providing a natural and actual grounding of possibility. Stressing the importance of ontological considerations in any theory of possibility, it is argued that the account of possibility in terms of dispositional properties provides a more palatable ontology than those of its competitors. Coming at it from the other direction, the dispositional account of possibility also provides motivation for taking an ontology of dispositions more seriously. As well as the relevant dispositional notions required to lay out the view, the paper discusses the dispositional realism needed as the basis for the account of possibility.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01130.x
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.

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