Berkeley's "defense" of "commonsense"

Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (3):315-338 (2011)
Berkeley scholars can hardly resist dealing with the question of how his philosophical system relates to commonsense. It is an irresistible question because it first appears to have a sensational answer. On the one hand, Berkeley claims to "side in all things with the Mob," and on the other, his denial of the existence of matter seems as contrary to commonsense as any philosophical view can be. The articles, chapters, books and conference papers on this one aspect of Berkeley's philosophy alone could make a sizeable bibliography. Interpretations run the gamut, from A. A. Luce's judgment that Berkeley's account of the sensible is commonsense itself, to Jonathan Bennett's pronouncement that Berkeley's attitude ..
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2011.0076
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