Dialectica 59 (1):67–73 (2005)
The paper shows – contra what has been argued by Trenton Merricks – that counterpart theory, when conjoined with composition as identity, does not entail mereological essentialism. What Merrick’s argument overlooks is that contingent identity is but one of the effects of grounding identity across possible worlds on similarity.
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Composition is Identity and Mereological Nihilism.Claudio Calosi - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv109.
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