Dissonance and Doxastic Resistance

Erkenntnis 80 (5):957-974 (2015)
Authors
Cristina Borgoni
University of Graz
Abstract
This paper focuses on the puzzling situation of having beliefs that are resistant to one’s own critical reasoning. This phenomenon happens, for example, when an individual does not succeed in eliminating a belief by evaluating it as false. I argue that this situation involves a specific type of irrationality—not yet properly identified in the literature—which I call ‘critical doxastic resistance’. The aim of this paper is to characterize this type of irrationality. Understanding such a phenomenon sheds light on the type of agency that we exercise when we reason critically. Moreover, it illustrates one relevant relationship between agential rational control of our beliefs and the rational functioning of beliefs as being responsive to reasons. I argue that critical doxastic resistance is characterized by a failure to meet the following rational norm: in critical reasoning, the results of evaluative reasoning should automatically transfer into, and be implemented by, the reasoning or beliefs under evaluation.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-014-9691-0
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References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Citations of this work BETA

Dissonance and Moorean Propositions.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):107-127.
Unendorsed Beliefs.Cristina Borgoni - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):49-68.

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