Dissonance and Irrationality: A Criticism of The In‐Between Account of Dissonance Cases

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):48-57 (2016)
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Abstract

In a dissonance case, a person sincerely and with conviction asserts that P, while his/her overall automatic behavior suggests that he/she believes that not-P. According to Schwitzgebel, this is a case of in-between believing. This article raises several concerns about Schwitzgebel's account and proposes an alternative view. I argue that the in-between approach yields incorrect results in belief self-ascriptions and does not capture the psychological conflict underlying the individual's dissonance. I advance the view that in relevant cases the dissonant individual has two mutually contradictory beliefs.

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Cristina Borgoni
Universität Bayreuth

Citations of this work

Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Evil Demon Inside.Nicholas Silins - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):325-343.
Why ‘Believes’ is Not a Vague Predicate.Sophie Archer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3029-3048.
Dissonance and Moorean Propositions.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):107-127.
Self-Deception and Shifting Degrees of Belief.Chi Yin Chan & Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (8):1204-1220.

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References found in this work

Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Controlling Attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.Brie Gertler - 2011 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.

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