Health Care Analysis 15 (2):153-8 (2007)
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Abstract |
Various debates in bioethics have been focused on whether non-persons, such as marginal humans or non-human animals, deserve respectful treatment. It has been argued that, where we cannot agree on whether these individuals have moral status, we might agree that they have symbolic value and ascribe to them moral value in virtue of their symbolic significance. In the paper I resist the suggestion that symbolic value is relevant to ethical disputes in which the respect for individuals with no intrinsic moral value is in conflict with the interests of individuals with intrinsic moral value. I then turn to moral status and discuss the suitability of personhood as a criterion. There some desiderata for a criterion for moral status: it should be applicable on the basis of our current scientific knowledge; it should have a solid ethical justification; and it should be in line with some of our moral intuitions and social practices. Although it highlights an important connection between the possession of some psychological properties and eligibility for moral status, the criterion of personhood does not meet the desiderata above. I suggest that all intentional systems should be credited with moral status in virtue of having preferences and interests that are relevant to their well-being
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Keywords | research ethics animal ethics moral status |
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DOI | 10.1007/s10728-006-0031-7 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Case for Animal Rights.Tom Regan - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Noûs. Oxford University Press. pp. 425-434.
All Animals Are Equal.Peter Singer - 1989 - In Tom Regan & Peter Singer (eds.), Animal Rights and Human Obligations. Oxford University Press. pp. 215--226.
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Citations of this work BETA
Empirical Methods in Animal Ethics.Kirsten Persson & David Shaw - 2015 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 28 (5):853-866.
Mary Anne Warren and the Boundaries of the Moral Community.Timothy Furlan - 2022 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 31 (2):230-246.
Implications of Recent Developments in Ireland for the Status of the Embryo.Sheelagh Mcguinness & Sorcha Uí Chonnachtaigh - 2011 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 20 (3):396-408.
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