Health Care Analysis 15 (2):153-8 (2007)
Various debates in bioethics have been focused on whether non-persons, such as marginal humans or non-human animals, deserve respectful treatment. It has been argued that, where we cannot agree on whether these individuals have moral status, we might agree that they have symbolic value and ascribe to them moral value in virtue of their symbolic signiﬁcance. In the paper I resist the suggestion that symbolic value is relevant to ethical disputes in which the respect for individuals with no intrinsic moral value is in conﬂict with the interests of individuals with intrinsic moral value. I then turn to moral status and discuss the suitability of personhood as a criterion. There some desiderata for a criterion for moral status: it should be applicable on the basis of our current scientiﬁc knowledge; it should have a solid ethical justiﬁcation; and it should be in line with some of our moral intuitions and social practices. Although it highlights an important connection between the possession of some psychological properties and eligibility for moral status, the criterion of personhood does not meet the desiderata above. I suggest that all intentional systems should be credited with moral status in virtue of having preferences and interests that are relevant to their well-being
|Keywords||research ethics animal ethics moral status|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Case for Animal Rights.Tom Regan - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Noûs. Oxford University Press. pp. 425-434.
Animal Rights and Human Obligations.Tom Regan & Peter Singer (eds.) - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
Animal Rights, Animal Minds, and Human Mindreading.Matteo Mameli & Lisa Bortolotti - 2006 - Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (2):84-89.
The Failure of Theories of Personhood.Tom L. Beauchamp - 1999 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (4):309-324.
Citations of this work BETA
Empirical Methods in Animal Ethics.Kirsten Persson & David Shaw - 2015 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 28 (5):853-866.
Implications of Recent Developments in Ireland for the Status of the Embryo.Sheelagh Mcguinness & Sorcha Uí Chonnachtaigh - 2011 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 20 (3):396-408.
Similar books and articles
Is Equal Moral Consideration Really Compatible with Unequal Moral Status?John Rossi - 2010 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 20 (3):251-276.
Moral Agency in Other Animals.Paul Shapiro - 2006 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (4):357-373.
Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things.Warren Mary Anne - 1997 - Clarendon Press.
An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism.Thaddeus Metz - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):387-402.
On the Need to Redress an Inadequacy in Animal Welfare Science: Toward an Internally Coherent Framework.Andrew Fenton - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (1):73-93.
Moral Status, Speciesism, and Liao’s Genetic Account.Christopher Grau - 2010 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (3):387-96.
Moral Status as a Matter of Degree?David DeGrazia - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):181-198.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads98 ( #49,159 of 2,143,900 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #280,613 of 2,143,900 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.