Horwich on Natural and Non-Natural Meaning
Acta Analytica 29 (2):229-253 (2014)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Paul Horwich’s Use Theory of Meaning (UTM) depends on his rejection of Paul Grice’s distinction between natural and non-natural meaning and his Univocality of Meaning Thesis, as he wishes to deflate the meaning-relation to usage. Horwich’s programme of deflating the meaning-relation (i.e. how words, sentences, etc., acquire meaning) to some basic regularity of usage cannot be carried through if the meaning-relation depends on the minds of users. Here, I first give a somewhat detailed account of the distinction between natural and non-natural meaning in order to set the stage for Horwich’s critique of it. I then present Horwich’s critique of the distinction and show how that rejection accords with his overall view of meaning as use. Horwich’s rejection of the distinction between natural and non-natural meaning, I argue in the last section, is ill founded, and because UTM depends on this rejection, UTM is stillborn
|
Keywords | Paul Horwich Use theory of meaning Univocality of meaning thesis Paul Grice Natural meaning Non-natural meaning |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1007/s12136-013-0196-2 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
View all 34 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich's Use Theory of Meaning.Anil Gupta - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):654 - 666.
Review of Reflections on Meaning, by Paul Horwich. [REVIEW]Eric Swanson - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):131-134.
Meaning In Speech and In Thought.Stephen Schiffer - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):141-159.
How Use Theories of Meaning Can Accommodate Shared Meanings: A Modal Account of Semantic Deference.Antonio Rauti - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):285-303.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2013-08-01
Total downloads
59 ( #113,325 of 2,308,283 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #106,251 of 2,308,283 )
2013-08-01
Total downloads
59 ( #113,325 of 2,308,283 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #106,251 of 2,308,283 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Monthly downloads