Ist das Erleben Teil des Erlebten?

Phänomenologische Forschungen (2009):37-59 (2009)
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Abstract

If the inner consciousness of a mental state is a part of the mental state itself, then one is forced to admit an 'inner consciousness of the inner consciousness'. This counterintuitive consequence can however be avoided, if we conceive of the inner consciousness of the mental state as a 'mode of giveness' of the state itself. This paper discusses Brentano's theory of inner consciousness from the point of view of Husserl's philosophy.

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Andrea Borsato
Scuola Normale Superiore

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