Humana Mente 4 (19):79-104 (2011)

Authors
Giorgio Lando
Università degli Studi dell'Aquila
Andrea Borghini
Università degli Studi di Milano
Abstract
The interpretation of Lewis‘s doctrine of natural properties is difficult and controversial, especially when it comes to the bearers of natural properties. According to the prevailing reading – the minimalist view – perfectly natural properties pertain to the micro-physical realm and are instantiated by entities without proper parts or point-like. This paper argues that there are reasons internal to a broadly Lewisian kind of metaphysics to think that the minimalist view is fundamentally flawed and that a liberal view, according to which natural properties are instantiated at several or even at all levels of reality, should be preferred. Our argument proceeds by reviewing those core principles of Lewis‘s metaphysics that are most likely to constrain the size of the bearers of natural properties: the principle of Humean supervenience, the principle of recombination in modal realism, the hypothesis of gunk, and the thesis of composition as identity.
Keywords David Lewis  Mereology  Supervenience  Natural properties  Gunk  Composition as identity  Recombination
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2011, 2018
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

David Lewis.Daniel Nolan - 2005 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Non-Naturalism: The Jackson Challenge.Jussi Suikkanen - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-110.
Can Moral Principles Explain Supervenience?Aaron Elliott - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):629-659.
Is Naturalness Natural?Thompson Naomi - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):381-396.
Goodbye, Humean Supervenience.Troy Cross - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:129-153.
Moral Properties: Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals.James Carl Klagge - 1983 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
Against Reductive Ethical Naturalism.Justin Klocksiem - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):1991-2010.
Quantity and Quality: Naturalness in Metaphysics.M. Eddon - 2009 - Dissertation, Rutgers University
Mundos possíveis, propriedades naturais e mereologia.Renato Rocha - 2017 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism.Ralph Wedgwood - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):199-215.
Natural Properties and Bottomless Determination.Bence Nanay - 2014 - Americal Philosophical Quarterly 51:215-226.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-07-04

Total views
325 ( #25,230 of 2,421,914 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #33,299 of 2,421,914 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes