Propositional attitudes and formal ontology

Synthese 98 (2):187 - 242 (1994)

This paper develops — within an axiomatic theory of properties, relations, and propositions which accords them well-defined existence and identity conditions — a sententialist-functionalist account of belief as a symbolically mediated relation to a special kind of propositional entity, theproxy-encoding abstract proposition. It is then shown how, in terms of this account, the truth conditions of English belief reports may be captured in a formally precise and empirically adequate way that accords genuinely semantic status to familiar opacity data.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01063942
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References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Mind, Language, and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.

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