Robotic Nudges: The Ethics of Engineering a More Socially Just Human Being

Science and Engineering Ethics 22 (1):31-46 (2016)
Abstract
Robots are becoming an increasingly pervasive feature of our personal lives. As a result, there is growing importance placed on examining what constitutes appropriate behavior when they interact with human beings. In this paper, we discuss whether companion robots should be permitted to “nudge” their human users in the direction of being “more ethical”. More specifically, we use Rawlsian principles of justice to illustrate how robots might nurture “socially just” tendencies in their human counterparts. Designing technological artifacts in such a way to influence human behavior is already well-established but merely because the practice is commonplace does not necessarily resolve the ethical issues associated with its implementation
Keywords Autonomy  Design ethics  Nudges  Paternalism  Robot ethics  Robot companions  Rawls  Social justice
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DOI 10.1007/s11948-015-9636-2
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References found in this work BETA

Egalitarianism and Moral Bioenhancement.Robert Sparrow - 2014 - American Journal of Bioethics 14 (4):20-28.
Paternalism.Gerald Dworkin - 1972 - The Monist 56 (1):64-84.

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Artificial Intelligence as a Means to Moral Enhancement.Michal Klincewicz - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 48 (1):171-187.

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