Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions

Philosophy Compass 10 (9):636-645 (2015)

Authors
Kengo Miyazono
Hiroshima University
Lisa Bortolotti
University of Birmingham
Abstract
In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop. What processes lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of challenges and counter-evidence? Do the formation and maintenance of delusions require abnormal experience alone, or also reasoning biases or deficits? We hope to show that the focus on delusions has made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of the mind and continues to raise issues that are central to defining the concept of belief and gaining a better understanding of how people process information and learn about the world
Keywords delusions  beliefs  experience
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DOI 10.1111/phc3.12249
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The Predictive Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.

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