Philosophy Compass 10 (9):636-645 (2015)
AbstractIn this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop. What processes lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of challenges and counter-evidence? Do the formation and maintenance of delusions require abnormal experience alone, or also reasoning biases or deficits? We hope to show that the focus on delusions has made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of the mind and continues to raise issues that are central to defining the concept of belief and gaining a better understanding of how people process information and learn about the world
Similar books and articles
Delusions as Forensically Disturbing Perceptual Inferences.Jakob Hohwy & Vivek Rajan - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):5-11.
A sneaking suspicion: The semantics of emotional beliefs and delusions.Angus W. MacDonald - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):719-720.
Are the Deluded Believers? Are Philosophers Among the Deluded?George Graham - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4):337-339.
Affective Dimensions of the Phenomenon of Double Bookkeeping in Delusions.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew R. Broome - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):187-191.
Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments.Tim Bayne - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4):329-336.
From the internal lexicon to delusional belief.Max Coltheart - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3/2014):19-29.
The Causal Role Argument against Doxasticism about Delusions.Kengo Miyazono & Lisa Bortolotti - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):30-50.
Delusions, Illusions and Inference under Uncertainty.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):57-71.
The Ethics of Delusional Belief.Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):275-296.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Imagination.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2011 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
Psychosis and Intelligibility.Sofia Jeppsson - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (3):233-249.
Do delusions have and give meaning?Rosa Ritunnano & Lisa Bortolotti - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):949-968.
References found in this work
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science.Andy Clark - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):181-204.
Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology.Gregory Currie & Ian Ravenscroft - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Abductive inference and delusional belief.Max Coltheart, Peter Menzies & John Sutton - 2010 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 15 (1):261-287.