Shaking the bedrock

Philosophy Psychiatry Psychology 18 (1):77-87 (2011)
Abstract
In this paper, I articulate the thesis that most delusional beliefs are continuous with other irrational beliefs. Any interpreter with some knowledge about the cognitive and affective life of subjects with delusions can at least partially understand their reports, and explain and predict their behavior in intentional terms. I identify similarities and differences between this approach to the nature of delusions and the approach adopted by Rhodes and Gipps, who have recently defended the view that people with delusions do not share the same bedrock beliefs as people without (the Background Theory of Delusions).
Keywords belief  delusion  rationality
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,507
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Delusions and the Background of Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.
Continuing Commentary: Shaking the Bedrock.Lisa Bortolotti - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (1):77-87.
Delusions as Performance Failures.Philip Gerrans - 2001 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 6 (3).
The Folk Epistemology of Delusions.Dominic Murphy - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):19-22.
Intentionality Without Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392.
Can We Recreate Delusions in the Laboratory?Lisa Bortolotti, Rochelle Cox & Amanda Barnier - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):109 - 131.
Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.
Delusions.A. W. Young - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):571-589.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-04-15

Total downloads
1 ( #1,036,386 of 2,268,147 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #373,366 of 2,268,147 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes

Sign in to use this feature