Thought-contents and the formal ontology of sense

Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (1):43-114 (2003)
This paper articulates a formal theory of belief incorporating three key theses: (1) belief is a dyadic relation between an agent and a property; (2) this property is not the belief's truth condition (i.e., the intuitively self-ascribed property which the agent must exemplify for the belief to be true) but is instead a certain abstract property (a "thought-content") which contains a way of thinking of that truth condition; (3) for an agent a to have a belief "about" such-and-such items it is necessary that a possesses a language of thought, $M_{a}$ , and that a (is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms a sentence of $M_{a}$ in which there are terms that denote those objects. Employing an extended version of E. Zalta's system ILAO, the proffered theory locates thought-contents within a typed hierarchy of "senses" and their "modes of presentation", the provisional definitions of which (suppressing complications added later to accommodate the contents of beliefs about beliefs) are as follows. A mode of presentation of e is a ternary relation of the sort [λxyz z is a name in $M_{y}$ that denotes x, and $D_{e}yz$ ] in which $D_{e}$ is an e-determiner - a relation between agents and their mental expressions imposing a syntactico-semantic condition sufficient for such an expression to denote e therein. A sense of an entity e is an abstract property that "contains" a mode of presentation $R_{e}$ of e by dint of encoding its property-reduct [λx(∃y)(∃z) $R_{e}xyz$ ]. In particular, a thought-content is a sense T of an ordinary first-order property P containing a mode of presentation whose P-determiner $D_{P}$ is such that, for any y and z, $D_{P}yz$ entails that z is a λ-abstract [λv S] of $M_{y}$ in which S is a sentence whose non-logical parts stand in appropriate semantic relations to the constituents of T's (some of which may themselves be senses). Where $I_{a}$ is agent a's dedicated self-demonstrative and |T| is the mode of presentation contained in a thought-content T, the belief relation itself is then characterized as obtaining between a and T iff a( is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms the substitution instance $S(I_{a}/v)$ of a sentence S in $M_{a}$ such that |T|(P, a, [λv S]). The aforementioned "constituents" and "appropriate semantic relations" are formally characterized so as to permit a system of canonical descriptions for thought-contents of arbitrary complexity. These canonical descriptions are then employed to chart the nature and interrelations of belief de re, de dicto and de se and to identify the source of opacity in belief ascription
Keywords belief ascription  encoding  intensional logic  Mentalese  opaque  property  propositional attitude  transparent
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1022896025635
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,492
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Descriptions.Stephen Neale - 1990 - MIT Press.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Moral Belief Problem.Neil Sinclair - 2006 - Ratio 19 (2):249–260.
Contradictions, Objects, and Belief.Srećko Kovač - 2007 - In Jean-Yves Béziau & Alexandre Costa-Leite (eds.), Perspectives on Universal Logic. pp. 417.
Methodological Reflections on Belief.Robert C. Cummins - 1991 - In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press. pp. 53--70.
Egocentric Omniscience and Self-Ascriptive Belief.Brian MacPherson - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:125-140.
Confused Thought and Modes of Presentation.Krista Lawlor - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):21-36.
Fregean Senses, Modes of Presentation, and Concepts.Edward N. Zalta - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):335-359.
Names, Sense and Kripke’s Puzzle.Tim Crane - 1992 - From the Logical Point of View 2:11-26.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
20 ( #251,680 of 2,180,628 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #302,011 of 2,180,628 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums