Synthese 127 (3):359-387 (2001)
AbstractThe Doomsday argument purports to show that the risk of the human species going extinct soon has been systematically underestimated. This argument has something in common with controversial forms of reasoning in other areas, including: game theoretic problems with imperfect recall, the methodology of cosmology, the epistomology of indexical belief, and the debate over so-called fine-tuning arguments for the design hypothesis. The common denominator is a certain premiss: the Self-Sampling Assumption. We present two strands of argument in favor of this assumption. Through a series of throught experiments we then investigate some bizarre _prima facie_ consequences - backward causation, psychic powers, and an apparent conflict with the Principal Principle.
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Citations of this work
Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?Nick Bostrom - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):243-255.
Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?By Nick Bostrom - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):243–255.
Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards.Nick Bostrom - 2002 - J Evol Technol 9 (1).
Sleeping Beauty and Self-Location: A Hybrid Model.Nick Bostrom - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):59-78.
References found in this work
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Adam Elga - 2000 - Analysis 60 (2):143–147.