Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):21-42 (2001)
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| Abstract |
In this paper I argue that certain so-called conceivability arguments fail to show that a currently popular version of physicalism in the philosophy of mind is false. Concentrating on an argument due to David Chalmers, I first argue that Chalmers misrepresents the relation between conceivability and possibility. I then argue that the intuition behind the conceivability of so-called zombie worlds can be accounted for without having to suppose that such worlds are genuinely conceivable. I conclude with some general remarks about the nature of conceivability.
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| Keywords | Conceivability Metaphysics Mind Physicalism Chalmers, D |
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References found in this work BETA
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Why Zombies Are Inconceivable.Eric Marcus - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):477-90.
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The Property Dualism Argument Against Physicalism.Andrew Botterell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:223-242.
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