Diametros 44:110-139 (2015)

Authors
Sophie Botros
University of London
Abstract
Hume’s view that the object of moral feeling is a natural passion, motivating action, causes problems for justice. There is apparently no appropriate natural motive, whilst, if there were, its “partiality” would unfit it to ground the requisite impartial approval. We offer a critique of such solutions as that the missing non-moral motive is enlightened self-interest, or that it is feigned, or that it consists in a just disposition. We reject Cohon’s postulation of a moral motive for just acts, and also Harris’s attempt to dispense with motive as the source of their merit, by invoking extensive sympathy, and citing their beneficial societal consequences. These solutions assume that, if Hume remains a virtue ethicist, the natural virtues supply the paradigm. Taylor claims that a revolution in motivational psychology follows the inauguration of the artificial convention of justice, remoulding the natural virtues. This solution founders, we argue, upon unresolved contradictions besetting even these virtues
Keywords sympathy  character  virtue  justice  self-interest  passion  consequences  sentimentalism  impartiality  motive
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.13153/diam.44.2015.766
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,100
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory.Philip Reed - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):595-614.
Hume and the (False) Luster of Justice.Sharon R. Krause - 2004 - Political Theory 32 (5):628-655.
Sympathy as a “Natural”.Robert C. Solomon - 2004 - The Ruffin Series of the Society for Business Ethics 2004:53-58.
Humean Minds and Moral Theory.Sheldon Wein - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:229-236.
Kant on Sympathy and Moral Motives.Maria de Lourdes Borges - 2002 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 1 (2):183-199.
Hume's and Smith's Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances.Jon Rick - 2007 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (2):135-158.
Gerechtigkeit bauen – Variationen mit Hume.Anton Leist - 2014 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 62 (6):1029-1061.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-06-21

Total views
58 ( #158,404 of 2,324,541 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #177,812 of 2,324,541 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes