Reconciling the Principled Approach to Hearsay with the Rule of Law

Supreme Court Law Review 65 (2d):145-168 (2014)
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Abstract

My goal in this paper is to argue that the principled approach to hearsay is consistent with the rule of law. I begin by contrasting an instrumental conception of the rule of law with a conception that views the rule of law in primarily normative terms. I then turn my attention to a recent criticism of the Supreme Court of Canada’s principled approach to hearsay and suggest that if Michael Oakeshott’s normative interpretation of the rule of law is adopted, there is no tension between the principled approach to hearsay and the rule of law.

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2013-08-28

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Andrew Botterell
University of Western Ontario

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Mabe on Fuller.Christine Pierce - 1975 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 13 (4):511-513.

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