Informal Logic 33 (1):1-21 (2013)

David Botting
De La Salle University (PhD)
The lack of a theory of relevance in the current state of the art of informal logic has often been considered regrettable, a gap that must be filled before the Relevance-Sufficiency-Acceptability model can be considered complete. I wish to challenge this view. A theory of relevance is neither desirable nor possible. Informal logic can get by perfectly well, and has been doing so far, with relevance judgments that are by nature unanalysable and intuitive. Criticism of theories of relevance, for example in Woods , is deflated
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References found in this work BETA

Informal Logic: A Pragmatic Approach.Douglas Walton - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
Relevance.David Hitchcock - 1992 - Argumentation 6 (2):251-270.
Inference Claims.David Hitchcock - 2011 - Informal Logic 31 (3):191-229.
Can 'Big' Questions Be Begged?David Botting - 2011 - Argumentation 25 (1):23-36.
Premissary Relevance.J. Anthony Blair - 1992 - Argumentation 6 (2):203-217.

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Citations of this work BETA

Trust, Relevance, and Arguments.Fabio Paglieri & Cristiano Castelfranchi - 2014 - Argument and Computation 5 (2-3):216-236.
Johnson and the Soundness Doctrine.David Botting - 2016 - Argumentation 30 (4):501-525.

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