Why Common Sense Morality is Not Collectively Self-Defeating

Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):19-39 (2007)
Abstract
The so-called Common Sense Morality (C) is any moral theory that allows, or requires, an agent to accept special, non-instrumental reasons to give advantage to certain other persons, usually the agent’s friends or kin, over the interests of others. Opponents charge C with violating the requirement of impartiality defined as independence on positional characteristics of moral agents and moral patients. Advocates of C claim that C is impartial, but only in a positional manner in which every moral agent would acquire the same relational characteristics if that agent was in a certain relationship to the given moral patient. The opponents of C reply that a theory that allows for positional characteristics is self-defeating; it violates the requirement of prescriptivity due to its inability to provide moral recommendations what should happen all things considered. Advocates of C retort that a moral theory should be prescriptive by telling every agent what to do, not what should the joint outcome of those activities be. In this paper I analyze the last two moves of this debate: the objection that C is self-defeating and the reply that there is a plausible moral theory (C) that accommodates positional characteristics of special moral reasons. I argue that the last move wins. In the process I sketch out a theory able to accommodate agent-relative moral reason
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Continental Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 1897-1652
DOI 10.5840/pjphil2007122
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,606
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Why Common Sense Morality is Not Collectively Self-Defeating.Peter Boltuc - 2007 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):17-26.
Kant's Theory of Right as Aristotelian Phronesis.Sean Drysdale Walsh - 2012 - International Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):227-246.
Against Agent-Based Virtue Ethics.Michael S. Brady - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (1):1-10.
Francis Hutcheson: Why Be Moral?Douglas R. Paletta - 2011 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (2):149-159.
Causation and the Making/Allowing Distinction.Sarah McGrath - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):81 - 106.
Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons.Marion Hourdequin - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):403 - 419.
Moral Responsibility and Motivational Mechanisms.James D. Steadman - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):473 - 492.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-01-09

Total downloads

11 ( #402,481 of 2,168,638 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #82,721 of 2,168,638 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums