Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36 (2015)
This paper replies to objections from perceptual distortion against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that some pairs of distorted and undistorted experiences share contents without sharing phenomenal characters, which is incompatible with the supervenience thesis. In reply, I suggest that such cases are not counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in some way compared to those of normal experiences. This can be shown by considering limit cases of perceptual distortion, for example, maximally blurry experiences, which manifestly lack details present in clear experiences. I argue that since there is no reasonable way to draw the line between distorted experiences that have degraded content and distorted experiences that do not, we should allow that an increase in distortion is always acc..
|Keywords||representationalism intentionalism distortion blur blurry vision intentionalism intentionality perceptual content double vision transparency perspective phenomenal concepts consciousness phenomenal character|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
The Representational Character of Experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Why Are Some Phenomenal Experiences 'Vivid' and Others 'Faint'? Representationalism, Imagery, and Cognitive Phenomenology.David Bourget - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
Some Reflections on Husserlian Intentionality, Intentionalism, and Non-Propositional Contents.Corijn van Mazijk - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):499-517.
Similar books and articles
Seeing It All Clearly: The Real Story on Blurry Vision.Robert Schroer - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):297-301.
Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience.Michael Tye - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):137-51.
Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content.Jeff Speaks - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.
Ambiguous Figures and the Spatial Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Defense of Representationalism.René Jagnow - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):325-346.
Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Nonconceptual Content.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.
Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology.Michael Shim - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (3):197-215.
Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character.Fiona Macpherson - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Stirling
How Representationalism Can Account for the Phenomenal Significance of Illumination.René Jagnow - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):551-572.
Added to index2012-11-01
Total downloads1,083 ( #585 of 2,164,866 )
Recent downloads (6 months)45 ( #5,719 of 2,164,866 )
How can I increase my downloads?