Consciousness is Underived Intentionality

Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58 (2010)
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Abstract

Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: I argue that they are underived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived intentional states are phenomenal states. I clarify these claims and argue for each of them. I also address objections which touch on a range of topics, including meaning holism and concept empiricism. I conclude with a brief discussion of the consequences of the proposed view for the project of naturalizing consciousness. testwordword

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Author's Profile

David Bourget
University of Western Ontario

Citations of this work

The Varieties of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.
The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.
Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.

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