Alban Bouvier
Institut Jean Nicod
The issue of knowing what it means for a group to have collective beliefs is being discussed more and more in contemporary philosophy of the social sciences and philosophy of mind. Margaret Gilbert’s reconsideration of Durkheim’s viewpoint in the framework of the plural subject’s account is one of the most famous. This has implications in the history and the sociology of science—as well asin the history and sociology of philosophy—although Gilbert only outlined them in the former fields and said nothing about the latter. Symmetrically but independently, a historian of science, Mara Beller, has recently challenged Kuhn’s conception of the role of consensus in sciences in a brilliant analysis by carefully studying the history of Copenhagen School of Quantum Mechanics. Not only does she show the role of disagreement and controversies, but she even shakes up the very idea of individual beliefs. Each scientist could be seen as divided into several selves. This paper contends that these two conceptions open important new horizons in several domains, especially if they are linked together. The paper assesses this claim in the light of empirical examples like the Vienna Circle, Copenhagen School, and, eventually, Cartesian philosophy.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/0048393103260772
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,339
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Fallacies.C. L. Hamblin - 1970 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 160:492-492.
On Social Facts.Michael Root - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):675.
An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. [REVIEW]Joseph Moore - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (4):705.
Collective Belief And Acceptance.K. Brad Wray - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):319-333.
15 Scientific Cognition as Distributed Cognition.Ronald Giere - 2002 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press. pp. 285.

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

In What Sense Is Scientific Knowledge Collective Knowledge?Hyundeuk Cheon - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (4):407-423.
Collective Scientific Knowledge.Melinda Fagan - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):821-831.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
11 ( #826,071 of 2,448,786 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #444,630 of 2,448,786 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes