Erkenntnis 82 (3):513-530 (2017)

Authors
David Bourget
University of Western Ontario
Abstract
This paper defends the view that perceptual ascriptions such as “Jones sees a cat” are sometimes intensional. I offer a range of examples of intensional perceptual ascriptions, respond to objections to intensional readings of perceptual ascriptions, and show how widely accepted semantic accounts of intensionality can explain the key features of intensional perceptual ascriptions.
Keywords intensionality  perception  perceptual experience  generalized quantifiers  montague  propositionalism
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-016-9830-x
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
Sense and Sensibilia.J. L. AUSTIN - 1962 - Oxford University Press.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.

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Citations of this work BETA

A New Perceptual Adverbialism.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (8):413-446.

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