Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions

Erkenntnis 82 (3):513-530 (2017)
Abstract
This paper defends the view that perceptual ascriptions such as “Jones sees a cat” are sometimes intensional. I offer a range of examples of intensional perceptual ascriptions, respond to objections to intensional readings of perceptual ascriptions, and show how widely accepted semantic accounts of intensionality can explain the key features of intensional perceptual ascriptions.
Keywords intensionality  perception  perceptual experience  generalized quantifiers  montague  propositionalism
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-016-9830-x
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References found in this work BETA
What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Harvard University Press.
Generalized Quantifiers and Natural Language.Jon Barwise & Robin Cooper - 1981 - Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (2):159--219.
The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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