Induction, probabilités et confirmation chez Carnap

Revue de Synthèse 127 (1):115-139 (2006)
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Abstract

L'idée d'associer probabilité et induction n'est pas propre au xxe siècle, mais elle a reçu un développement systématique lorsque les philosophes néo-positivistes s'en sont emparés. Dès les années 1940, le philosophe Rudolf Carnap s'est proposé de relever le «défi humien» en fondant une théorie de la confirmation par la construction d'une logique probabiliste dite «inductive». Ce projet avait été esquissé à Cambridge dans les années 1920 par l'économiste John M. Keynes. Examiner le programme de Carnap dans sa totalité, le situer dans son contexte historique, suivre son évolution et les influences qu'il a eues, tels sont les buts de cet article. The idea of associating probability and induction is not a theme suitable for the xxth century but it has received a systematic development when the neo-positivist philosophers seized it. Beginning with the 1940's, the philosopher Rudolph Carnap proposed to affront the «Humian challenge» by founding a theory of confirmation through the construction of a probabilistic logic called «inductive». This project had been outlined in Cambridge during the 1920's by the economist John M. Keynes. To examine Carnap's program in its totality, to situate it in its historical context, to follow its evolution and the influences it has had, these are the aims of this article.

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La Logique de Leibniz.Louis Couturat - 1901 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 9 (5):6-7.
A World of Propensities.Karl R. Popper - 1991 - Mind 100 (1):161-162.

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