Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs

Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):263 - 305 (1996)
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Abstract

We describe a model of iterated belief revision that extends the AGM theory of revision to account for the effect of a revision on the conditional beliefs of an agent. In particular, this model ensures that an agent makes as few changes as possible to the conditional component of its belief set. Adopting the Ramsey test, minimal conditional revision provides acceptance conditions for arbitrary right-nested conditionals. We show that problem of determining acceptance of any such nested conditional can be reduced to acceptance tests for unnested conditionals. Thus, iterated revision can be accomplished in a "virtual" manner, using uniterated revision

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Citations of this work

On the logic of iterated belief revision.Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence 89 (1-2):1-29.
Iterated Belief Revision.Robert Stalnaker - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):189-209.
Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-seven Iterated Theory Change Operators.Hans Rott - 2006 - In David Makinson, Jacek Malinowski & Heinrich Wansing (eds.), Towards Mathematical Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 269–296.
AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.

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References found in this work

Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.

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