Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs

Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):263 - 305 (1996)
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Abstract

We describe a model of iterated belief revision that extends the AGM theory of revision to account for the effect of a revision on the conditional beliefs of an agent. In particular, this model ensures that an agent makes as few changes as possible to the conditional component of its belief set. Adopting the Ramsey test, minimal conditional revision provides acceptance conditions for arbitrary right-nested conditionals. We show that problem of determining acceptance of any such nested conditional can be reduced to acceptance tests for unnested conditionals. Thus, iterated revision can be accomplished in a "virtual" manner, using uniterated revision

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Citations of this work

On the logic of iterated belief revision.Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence 89 (1-2):1-29.
Iterated Belief Revision.Robert Stalnaker - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):189-209.
Doxastic Logic.Michael Caie - 2019 - In Jonathan Weisberg & Richard Pettigrew (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 499-541.
Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 397-436.
The Irreducibility of Iterated to Single Revision.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (4):405-418.

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