Ontology of Knowledge is it a solipsism?


The Ontology of Knowledge (OK) states: -The world as a Knowledge, set by the principle of the Logos is infinitely more persistent than the world as an event regulated by the laws of physics. To eventually state: -The world is the act of understanding my knowledge. These propositions seem to place the world within Knowledge, or at least they seem to make of Knowledge, the substance from which the subject gives rise for himself to a representation of the world and himself. The OK is realistic in that it states that there is a reality, but it also states clearly that the Reality is informal and that there is no being in reality, no other beings than those created by the subject in representation. That justifies the title of this article: Would the knowing subject be, in fact, the only being in the world, all other beings being only his representation ? While the Cogito guarantees the Existence of the "I" that enunciates it, is there no other Me than this "I"? As much as our mind can consent to the idea that objects and material facts are only representations, including the atoms of our own body, it seems absurd to us, paradoxical, contrary to the evidence of every moment, the idea that "I" would be the one and only knowing subject. The first part of this article proposes, by a clarification of concepts and terms, to answer specifically to the question of the existence of other “I's” The second part will try to widen the spectrum of our reflection to study, within the conceptual framework of the OK, the possibility of a supra-human thought/knowledge.
Keywords Ontology  Metaphysics  solipsism  philosophy of knowledge  materialism  philosophy of language
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