Authors
S. Andrew Schroeder
Claremont McKenna College
Marion Boulicault
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
What makes science trustworthy to the public? This chapter examines one proposed answer: the trustworthiness of science is based at least in part on its independence from the idiosyncratic values, interests, and ideas of individual scientists. That is, science is trustworthy to the extent that following the scientific process would result in the same conclusions, regardless of the particular scientists involved. We analyze this "idiosyncrasy-free ideal" for science by looking at philosophical debates about inductive risk, focusing on two recent proposals which offer different methods of avoiding idiosyncrasy: the high epistemic standards proposal and the democratic values proposal.
Keywords inductive risk  science and values  trust  political philosophy of science  value-free ideal  scientific objectivity
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