Representationalism and Sensory Modalities: An Argument for Intermodal Representationalism

American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):251-268 (2017)
Authors
David Bourget
University of Western Ontario
Abstract
Intermodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are fully determined by their contents. In contrast, intramodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are determined by their contents together with their intentional modes or manners of representation, which are nonrepresentational features corresponding roughly to the sensory modalities. This paper discusses a kind of experience that provides evidence for an intermodal representationalist view: intermodal experiences, experiences that unify experiences in different modalities. I argue that such experiences are much easier to explain on the intermodal view.
Keywords representationalism  sensory modalities  intermodal  crossmodal  multimodal
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References found in this work BETA

The Representational Character of Experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.
A Simple View of Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--66.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Rational Role of Experience.David Bourget - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):467-493.

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