American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):251-268 (2017)
AbstractIntermodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are fully determined by their contents. In contrast, intramodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are determined by their contents together with their intentional modes or manners of representation, which are nonrepresentational features corresponding roughly to the sensory modalities. This paper discusses a kind of experience that provides evidence for an intermodal representationalist view: intermodal experiences, experiences that unify experiences in different modalities. I argue that such experiences are much easier to explain on the intermodal view.
Similar books and articles
The Phenomenal Character of Visual Consciousness.Robert Schroer - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago
Representationalism, Perceptual Distortion and the Limits of Phenomenal Concepts.David Bourget - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36.
Agentive Awareness is Not Sensory Awareness.Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):761-780.
What Is It Like to See with Your Ears?: The Representational Theory of Mind.Dominic M. Mciver Lopes - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):439-453.
Intermodal Binding Awareness.Casey O'Callaghan - 2014 - In David J. Bennett & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 73-103.
Why Are Some Phenomenal Experiences 'Vivid' and Others 'Faint'? Representationalism, Imagery, and Cognitive Phenomenology.David Bourget - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):673-687.
The Multisensory Character of Perception.Casey O’Callaghan - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (10):551-569.
Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character.Fiona Macpherson - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Stirling
Exploring Subjective Representationalism.Neil Mehta - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):570-594.
On the Matching of Seen and Felt Shape by Newly Sighted Subjects.John Schwenkler - 2012 - I-Perception 3 (3):186-188.
Environmental Representationalists on Afterimages and Phosphenes: Putting Our Best Foot Forward.Robert Schroer - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):531-546.
Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content.Boyd Millar - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.
The Way Ripe Tomatoes Look: An Argument Against Externalist Representationalism.Max Deutsch - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (3):297-316.
Ambiguous Figures and the Spatial Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Defense of Representationalism.René Jagnow - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):325-346.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.
Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.David Bourget - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):381-408.
Relational Vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, Language: Essays in honor of Brian Loar. Routledge. pp. 137-166.
Anomalous Dualism: A New Approach to the Mind-Body Problem.David Bourget - 2020 - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.
References found in this work
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.
The Foundations of Arithmetic.Gottlob Frege - 1884/1950 - Evanston: Ill., Northwestern University Press.