The Fake, the Flimsy, and the Fallacious: Demarcating Arguments in Real Life

Argumentation 29 (4):10.1007/s10503-015-9359-1 (2015)
Authors
Massimo Pigliucci
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
Philosophers of science have given up on the quest for a silver bullet to put an end to all pseudoscience, as such a neat formal criterion to separate good science from its contenders has proven elusive. In the literature on critical thinking and in some philosophical quarters, however, this search for silver bullets lives on in the taxonomies of fallacies. The attractive idea is to have a handy list of abstract definitions or argumentation schemes, on the basis of which one can identify bad or invalid types of reasoning, abstracting away from the specific content and dialectical context. Such shortcuts for debunking arguments are tempting, but alas, the promise is hardly if ever fulfilled. Different strands of research on the pragmatics of argumentation, probabilistic reasoning and ecological rationality have shown that almost every known type of fallacy is a close neighbor to sound inferences or acceptable moves in a debate. Nonetheless, the kernel idea of a fallacy as an erroneous type of argument is still retained by most authors. We outline a destructive dilemma we refer to as the Fallacy Fork: on the one hand, if fallacies are construed as demonstrably invalid form of reasoning, then they have very limited applicability in real life. On the other hand, if our definitions of fallacies are sophisticated enough to capture real-life complexities, they can no longer be held up as an effective tool for discriminating good and bad forms of reasoning. As we bring our schematic “fallacies” in touch with reality, we seem to lose grip on normative questions. Even approaches that do not rely on argumentation schemes to identify fallacies fail to escape the Fallacy Fork, and run up against their own version of it
Keywords Fallacies  Demarcation  Fallacy Fork  Pseudoscience   Argumentum ad ignorantiam  Genetic fallacy   Post hoc ergo propter hoc   Ad hominem  Ecological rationality  Probabilistic reasoning  Pragma-dialetics
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DOI 10.1007/s10503-015-9359-1
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References found in this work BETA

Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life.Daniel C. Dennett & Jon Hodge - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):435-438.
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Guy Kahane - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):103-125.
Fallacies.C. L. Hamblin - 1970 - Vale Press.

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A Plea for Ecological Argument Technologies.Fabio Paglieri - 2017 - Philosophy and Technology 30 (2):209-238.

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