Authors
Cameron Boult
Brandon University
Abstract
Is there a distinctively epistemic kind of blame? It has become commonplace for epistemologists to talk about epistemic blame, and to rely on this notion for theoretical purposes. But not everyone is convinced. Some of the most compelling reasons for skepticism about epistemic blame focus on disanologies, or asymmetries, between the moral and epistemic domains. In this paper, I defend the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. I do so primarily by developing an account of the nature of epistemic blame. My account draws on a prominent line of theorizing in moral philosophy that ties blame to our relationships with one another. I argue that with my account of epistemic blame on hand, the most compelling worries about epistemic blame can be deflated. There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame.
Keywords epistemic blame  blame  epistemic normativity  social epistemology  epistemic responsibility  epistemic injustice  testimony
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12726
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Significance of Epistemic Blame.Cameron Boult - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
Blame as Performance.Mona Simion - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
Epistemic Blame.Cameron Boult - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass:e12762.

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