Ethics, Policy and Environment:1-21 (forthcoming)

Michel Bourban
Université de Lausanne
Lisa Broussois
Université paris 1
We challenge effective altruism (EA) on the basis that it should be more inclusive regarding the demands of altruism. EA should consider carefully agents’ intentions and the role those intentions can play in agents’ moral lives. Although we argue that good intentions play an instrumental role and can lead to better results, by adopting a Hutchesonian perspective, we show that intentions should, first and foremost, be considered for their intrinsic value. We examine offsetting and geoengineering, two so-called solutions to climate change supported by EA, to highlight the limitations of a narrow understanding of altruism.
Keywords effective altruism  Hutcheson  moral sense  benevolence  climate change  carbon offsetting  geoengineering
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DOI 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848175
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Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Climate Change and Individual Duties to Reduce GHG Emissions.Christian Baatz - 2014 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (1):1-19.

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