The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding

Abstract
One sometimes believes a proposition without grasping it. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this proposition. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that the phenomenal theory is more plausible than the inferential theory.
Keywords grasping grasp  phenomenal consciousness  experience  mode of presentation  understanding understand  proposition grasping  inferential role  conceptual role  phenomenal intentionality  cognitive phenomenology cognitive experience
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2015, 2017
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12208
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.

View all 96 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Rational Role of Experience.David Bourget - forthcoming - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-27.
Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions.David Bourget - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):513-530.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Intellectual Gestalts.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 174.
Moral Understanding and Knowledge.Amber Riaz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):113-128.
No Understanding Without Explanation.Michael Strevens - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):510-515.
Some Reflections on Seeing-as, Metaphor-Grasping and Imagining.Kathleen Stock - 2013 - Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (1):201-213.
Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 194-234.
Sense-Data.Paul Coates - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Understanding Consciousness.Charles Peter Siewert - 1994 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
Added to PP index
2015-06-26

Total downloads
927 ( #1,015 of 2,210,838 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
131 ( #951 of 2,210,838 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature