The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding

Authors
David Bourget
University of Western Ontario
Abstract
One sometimes believes a proposition without grasping it. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this proposition. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that the phenomenal theory is more plausible than the inferential theory.
Keywords grasping grasp  phenomenal consciousness  experience  mode of presentation
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Reprint years 2015, 2017
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12208
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References found in this work BETA

What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

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Citations of this work BETA

Phenomenal Dispositions.Henry Schiller - forthcoming - Synthese.
The Sound of Silence: Merleau‐Ponty on Conscious Thought.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):312-335.
The Rational Role of Experience.David Bourget - 2018 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):467-493.

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