Variation of information as a measure of one-to-one causal specificity

European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):11 (2018)
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Abstract

The interventionist account provides us with several notions permitting the qualification of causal relationships. In recent years, there has been a push toward formalizing these notions using information theory. In this paper, I discuss one of them, namely causal specificity. The notion of causal specificity is ambiguous as it can refer to at least two different concepts. After having presented these, I show that current attempts to formalize causal specificity in information theoretic terms have mostly focused on one of these two concepts. I then propose and apply a new information-theoretic measure which captures the other concept.

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Pierrick Bourrat
Macquarie University

References found in this work

Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):201-202.
Genetics and philosophy : an introduction.Paul Griffiths & Karola Stotz - 2013 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Causes That Make a Difference.C. Kenneth Waters - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (11):551-579.

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