Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo

Philosophia 41 (1):27-35 (2013)
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Abstract

We offer an overview of what we take to be the main themes in Annalisa Coliva’s book, Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. In particular, we focus on the ‘framework reading’ that she offers of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and its anti-sceptical implications. While broadly agreeing with the proposal that Coliva puts forward on this score, we do suggest one important supplementation to the view—viz., that this way of dealing with radical scepticism needs to be augmented with an account of the meta-sceptical problem which this proposal generates, which we call epistemic vertigo.

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Author Profiles

Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine
Cameron Boult
Brandon University

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
The significance of philosophical scepticism.Barry Stroud - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.

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