Why Are Some Phenomenal Experiences 'Vivid' and Others 'Faint'? Representationalism, Imagery, and Cognitive Phenomenology

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):673-687 (2017)
Abstract
One central brand of representationalism claims that the specific phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its content. A challenge for this view is that cognitive and perceptual experiences sometimes seem to have the same representational content while differing in phenomenal character. In particular, it might seem that one can have faint imagery experiences or conscious thoughts with the same contents as vivid perceptual experiences. This paper argues that such cases never arise, and that they are probably metaphysically impossible. I also suggest a fully representational account of differences in vividness between phenomenal experiences.
Keywords representationalism  imagery  cognitive phenomenology  vividness  phenomenal experience  consciousness
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2017.1278612
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References found in this work BETA
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.

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The Rational Role of Experience.David Bourget - forthcoming - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-27.

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