Why Are Some Phenomenal Experiences 'Vivid' and Others 'Faint'? Representationalism, Imagery, and Cognitive Phenomenology
Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15 (forthcoming)
One central brand of representationalism claims that the specific phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its content. A challenge for this view is that cognitive and perceptual experiences sometimes seem to have the same representational content while differing in phenomenal character. In particular, it might seem that one can have faint imagery experiences or conscious thoughts with the same contents as vivid perceptual experiences. This paper argues that such cases never arise, and that they are probably metaphysically impossible. I also suggest a fully representational account of differences in vividness between phenomenal experiences.
|Keywords||representationalism imagery cognitive phenomenology vividness phenomenal experience consciousness|
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