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“P and I Will Believe that not-P”: Diachronic Constraints on Rational Belief
Mind 104 (416):737-760 (1995)
Abstract
I provide a taxonomy of the various circumstances under which one might reasonably say "P and I will believe that not-P" or violate the Reflection PrincipleAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.
Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles.Sarah Moss - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):620-638.
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