Must I be forgiven?

Analysis 69 (2):227-233 (2009)
Abstract
Why do we find it upsetting when the victim of our wrongdoing refuses to accept our apologies? Why do we find it upsetting when the victim is unwilling to grant us the forgiveness that we are asking for?Let us introduce some terminology to address these questions. The offender initiates a redemption practice by apologizing or asking forgiveness. If the victim accepts the apologies or grants forgiveness, then the practice succeeds. If the victim does not accept the apologies or refuses to forgive, then the practice fails. Offender' s distress is the distress that an offender typically experiences when a redemption practice fails. As a matter of convention, the masculine pronoun refers to the offender, the feminine to the victim.So, suppose that we have two offenders who initiate a redemption practice and they are counterparts in all respects except for the fact that for the former the practice fails, whereas for the latter the practice succeeds. I will try to provide a normative account of the fact that the former typically experiences a kind of distress that is absent for the latter. That is, I will try to provide an account of offender's distress that makes the emotion into an apt emotion. I start with three unsuccessful attempts that are implicit in the literature on forgiveness, then construct my own account, and conclude by showing how my account provides error theories for the unsuccessful accounts
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/analys/anp006
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,122
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Wiping the Slate Clean: The Heart of Forgiveness.Lucy Allais - 2008 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (1):33–68.
Two Kinds of Respect.Stephen L. Darwall - 1977 - Ethics 88 (1):36-49.
XII-Apologies.Luc Bovens - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):219-239.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Affirmative Action and the Choice of Amends.George Hull - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):113-134.
XII-Apologies.Luc Bovens - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):219-239.
Racial Inequality.George Hull - 2016 - Philosophical Papers 45 (1-2):37-74.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Divine Punishment and Reconciliation.J. Brenton Stearns - 1981 - Journal of Religious Ethics 9 (1):118-130.
The Limits of Morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
The Problem of Unresolved Wrongdoing.Kenneth Einar Himma - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (4):405-422.
Forgiveness Without Apology.Karen D. Hoffman - 2008 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 82:135-151.
Hannah Arendt and Collective Forgiving.Glen Pettigrove - 2006 - Journal of Social Philosophy 37 (4):483–500.
Added to PP index
2009-04-11

Total downloads
88 ( #60,780 of 2,191,304 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #291,146 of 2,191,304 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature