Bodily Affects as Prenoetic Elements in Enactive Perception

Phenomenology and Mind 4 (1):78-93 (2013)


In this paper we attempt to advance the enactive discourse on perception by highlighting the role of bodily affects as prenoetic constraints on perceptual experience. Enactivists argue for an essential connection between perception and action, where action primarily means skillful bodily intervention in one’s surroundings. Analyses of sensory-motor contingencies (as in Noë 2004) are important contributions to the enactive account. Yet this is an incomplete story since sensory-motor contingencies are of no avail to the perceiving agent without motivational pull in one direction or another or a sense of the pertinent affective contingencies. Before directly addressing the issue of affect in perception, we explain our peculiar, low-level conception of affect as a form of world-involving intentionality that modulates (minimally) bodily behavior without necessarily possessing informational value of any kind. We then address the deficiency concerning affect in enactive accounts of perception by examining some exemplary forms of bodily affect that constrain perception. We show that bodily affect significantly contributes to (either limiting or enabling) our contact with the world in our perceptually operative attentive outlook, in a kind of perceptual interest or investment, and in social perception.

Download options


    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,856

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

2 (#1,460,336)

6 months
1 (#386,040)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

Locked-in Syndrome: A Challenge for Embodied Cognitive Science.Miriam Kyselo & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):517-542.
Sympathy in Perception.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
Making Enactivism Even More Embodied.Shaun Gallagher & Matthew Bower - 2013 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):232-247.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Self–Other Contingencies: Enacting Social Perception.Marek McGann & Hanne De Jaegher - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):417-437.
Enactive Music Cognition: Background and Research Themes.J. R. Matyja & A. Schiavio - 2013 - Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):351-357.
Intersubjectivity in Perception.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):163-178.
Neural Resonance: Between Implicit Simulation and Social Perception.Marc Slors - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):437-458.
Enactive Appraisal.Giovanna Colombetti - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):527-546.
William James on Emotion and Intentionality.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2005 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2):179-202.
Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
An Enactive-Phenomenological Approach to Veridical Perception.Shannon Vallor - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):39-60.