Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (3):549-579 (2020)

Authors
Matt Bower
Texas State University
Abstract
Several commentators have recently attributed conflicting accounts of the relation between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination to Husserl. Some say he is a proponent of the conjunctive view that the two kinds of experience are fundamentally the same. Others deny this and purport to find in Husserl distinct and non-overlapping accounts of their fundamental natures, thus committing him to a disjunctive view. My goal is to set the record straight. Having briefly laid out the problem under discussion and the terms of the debate, I then review the proposals that have been advanced, disposing of some and marking others for further consideration. A.D. Smith’s disjunctive reading is among the latter. I discuss it at length, arguing that Smith fails to show that Husserl’s views on perceptual experience entail a form of disjunctivism. Following that critical discussion, I present a case for a conjunctive reading of Husserl’s account of perceptual experience.
Keywords philosophy of perception  disjunctivism  hallucination  Edmund Husserl  phenomenology  naive realism  perceptual experience
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2020.0051
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References found in this work BETA

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Appearance and Illusion.James Genone - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):339-376.

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