The Deductive/Inductive Distinction
Informal Logic 16 (3):159-184 (1994)
Abstract
In this paper I examine five distinctions between deductive and inductive arguments, concluding that the best of the five defines a deductive argument as one in which conclusive favorable relevance to its conclusion is attributed to its premises, and an inductive argument as any argument that is not deductive. This distinction, unlike its rivals, is both exclusive and exhaustive; permits both good and bad arguments of each kind; and is both useful and needed in evaluating at least some argumentsDOI
10.22329/il.v16i3.2455
My notes
Similar books and articles
The 'Most Important and Fundamental' Distinction in Logic.G. C. Goddu - 2002 - Informal Logic 22 (1).
Induction and reasoning to the best explanation.Richard A. Fumerton - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (4):589-600.
Inductive countersupport.Georg J. W. Dorn - 1995 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (1):187 - 189.
On the alleged impossibility of inductive probability.Ellery Eells - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):111-116.
Deductive and inductive conditional inferences: Two modes of reasoning.Henrik Singmann & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2011 - Thinking and Reasoning 17 (3):247 - 281.
The Force of Hume’s Skepticism About Unobserved Matters of Fact.John Greco - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Research 23:289-306.
Consciousness and the state/transitive/creature distinction.R. McBride - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):181-196.
Logical Form, Probability Interpretations, and the Inductive/Deductive Distinction.James B. Freeman - 1983 - Informal Logic 5 (2).
Analytics
Added to PP
2013-11-24
Downloads
25 (#465,850)
6 months
1 (#451,971)
2013-11-24
Downloads
25 (#465,850)
6 months
1 (#451,971)
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
The 'Most Important and Fundamental' Distinction in Logic.G. C. Goddu - 2002 - Informal Logic 22 (1).
References found in this work
Confirmation and relevance.Wesley C. Salmon - 1983 - In Peter Achinstein (ed.), The Concept of Evidence. Oxford University Press.