European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):337-348 (2015)

Matthew Boyle
University of Chicago
This paper is a critical study of Quassim Cassam’s Self-Knowledge for Humans (Oxford University Press, 2014). Cassam claims that theorists who emphasize the “transparency” of questions about our own attitudes to questions about the wider world are committed to an excessively rationalistic conception of human thought. I dispute this, and make some clarificatory points about how to understand the relevant notion of “transparency”. I also argue that Cassam’s own “inferentialist” account of attitudinal self-knowledge entails an unacceptable alienation from our own attitudes. In closing, I make some brief remarks on the value of understanding privileged self-knowledge, and how this topic is connected with more general questions about the nature of subjectivity.
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DOI 10.1111/ejop.12117
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Self‐Awareness and Self‐Understanding.B. Scot Rousse - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):162-186.
XIII—Self-Knowledge as a Personal Achievement.Ursula Renz - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):253-272.
The Value of Transparent Self-Knowledge.Fleur Jongepier - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):65-86.

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