Dewey’s epistemology: An argument for warranted assertions, knowing, and meaningful classroom practice

Educational Theory 56 (1):57-68 (2006)
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Abstract

In an effort to navigate the treacherous path between professionalism and social relevancy, this essay takes up an area of professional philosophy — epistemology — with the intention of reclaiming the integrative role John Dewey held for philosophy and classroom practice. Deron Boyles asserts that epistemology can and should represent an area of inquiry that is relevant and useful for philosophy of education, especially as it develops classroom practices that foster inquiry. He specifically seeks to revive Dewey’s conception of warranted assertibility in an effort to show the value of fallibilist epistemology in practical and social teaching and learning contexts. By highlighting the distinctions between traditional epistemology and Dewey’s conception of knowing, Boyles demonstrates that epistemology has value insofar as it highlights a more useful, instrumentalist theory of knowing that is applicable to classroom practice.

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